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Recent Cases
CORPORATION RESIDENCE FOR PURPOSES OF VENUE IN MISSOURI
State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen-
Suits brought solely against a corporation in Missouri must be commenced
in accordance with section 508.040, RSMo 1959, and under this section residence
of the corporation is not a venue consideration.2 When a corporation has been sued
along with other individual defendants, the question of the corporation's residence
becomes important. In joint defendant cases where all defendants are not corpora-
tion,3 venue is governed by section 508.010(2) which provides, "When there are
several defendants, and they reside in different counties, the suit may be brought
in any such county," 4 or 508.010(3) which provides, "When there are several
defendants, some residents and others nonresidents of the state, suit may be
brought in any county in this state in which any defendant resides.' In the mul-
tiple defendant case venue is proper as to all defendants so long as the suit is
brought in a county where one of the defendants resides.5 Therefore for purposes
of venue the determination of a corporation's residence is important only when
the defendant corporation's residence is asserted as the basis for venue in a suit
against more than one defendant.
The above statutory provisions governing venue have been in force in Mis-
1. State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen, 359 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. En Banc 1962).
2. "Suits against corporations shall be commenced either in the county
where the cause of action accrued, or in case the corporation defendant is a rail-
road company owning, controlling or operating a railroad running into or through
two or more counties in this state, then in either of such counties, or in any
county where such corporations shall have or usually keep an office or agent for
the transaction of their usual and customary business." § 508.040, RSMo 1959.
3. In State ex rel. Baker v. Goodman, 364 Mo. 1202, 274 S.W.2d 293 (En
Banc 1954), it was held that where two corporations are sued jointly the special
statute applicable to corporation's venue should govern over the general venue
statute. Therefore venue was determined under § 508.040, RSMo 1949, rather than
under § 508.010(2), RSMo 1949.
4. In State ex rel. Columbia Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 314 Mo. 373, 284 S.W.
464 (En Banc 1926), the court adopted the rule then stated at 14A C. J. Corpora-
tons § 2879 (1921) that:
A statute fixing the venue in actions against corporations does not apply
where a corporation is sued jointly with another. But this rule is not
applicable where no cause of action exists against the codefendant, or
where plaintiff dismisses the suit as to him before the trial.
5. State ex rel. Columbia Nat'l Bank v. Davis, supra note 4; State ex rel.
Bowden v. Jensen, supra note 1.
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souri for many years6 and State ex rel. Henning v. Williams in 1939 seemed to
have decided what determined corporate residence for venue purposes. In the
Williams case corporate residence was defined by adopting part of the venue stat-
ute applicable when a corporation is the sole defendant; thus a corporation resided
for purposes of venue "in any county where such corporations shall have or usually
keep an office or agent for the transaction of their usual and customary business."8
This result was justified by the court on the grounds that the statutes and cases
indicated a corporation must have one or more residences where it would be sub-
ject to service;0 that if sued alone a suit might be brought in any one of several
possible residences; 10 and therefore there seemed to be no good reason that res-
idence be determined in any different manner when its residence is the basis for
venue over multiple defendants.
The rule of the Williams case is no longer the law in Missouri and the depar-
ture has created a situation of confusion in recent years. The enactment of The
General and Business Corporation Law of Missouri in 1943 (now chapter 351,
RSMo 1959) created the basis for abandoning the Williams rule and the supreme
court has struggled with a chain of cases involving statutory interpretation in an
attempt to settle what constitutes a corporation's residence for venue purposes.
State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen"4 is the most recent, but perhaps not the last decision
regarding the problem.
The first case to consider the problem following the enactment of the 1943
Corporation Law was State ex rel. O'Keefe v. Brown.12 There the last sentence of
a provision dealing with how to change a registered office or registered agent- was
seized upon as the basis for the decision. The sentence read then, as it does today,
"The location or residence of any corporation shall be deemed for all purposes to
be in the county where its registered office is maintained." The individual codefend-
ant objected to venue because the domestic corporation, whose residence was
claimed by plaintiff as the basis for venue, maintained its registered office in a
different county from that in which suit had been brought. Venue was found to be
improper because the statute defining residence applied "with equal force to venue
statutes.""1
6. State ex rel. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Gantt, 274 Mo. 490, 203 S.W. 964
(En Banc 1918), traces the history of early venue statutes in Missouri.
7. State ex rel. Henning v. Williams, 345 Mo. 22, 131 S.W.2d 561 (En Banc
8. § 508.040, RSMo 1959.
9. "Each corporation shall have and maintain a public office or place in the
state for the transaction of its business, where legal service may be obtained upon
it." § 4596, 4597, RSMo 1929; see also § 4598 Mo. ST. ANN. 1937. Today similar
provisions are found in § 351.370, RSMo 1959, and § 351.380, RSMo 1959.
10. § 723, RSMo 1929 [today § 508.040, RSMo 1959].
11. State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen, supra note 1.
12. State ex rel. O'Keefe v. Brown, 361 Mo. 618, 235 S.W.2d 304 (En Banc
1951).
13. Mo. LAws 1943 § 10, at 410; 351.375(4), RSMo 1949 [today 351.375(4),
RSMo 19592.
14. State ex rel. O'Keefe v. Brown, supra note 11, at 306.
[Vol. 29
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The next case was State ex rel. Whiteman v. James,5 where it was announced
that the statutory determinant of a domestic corporation's residence was also de-
terminative of a foreign corporation's residence for purposes of venue. The court
relied on the Brown case and then commented, "Plainer language that that used
to prescribe or fix residence of a corporation 'for all purposes' could hardly be found.
Certainly one purpose is that of venue under this statute."16 It was observed that
this result was proper notwithstanding the fact that when sued alone a corpora-
tion might be sued in one of several counties.
Judge Hyde dissenting in the James case felt that a reasonable construction
of section 351.375 was "that it adds another office to those where service can be
made and venue established." Justifying this position he said that the general pro-
visions found in section 351.375 should not control the specific provisions of sec-
tions 508.010 and 508.040 which were intended as venue statutes.
Therefore the word from the supreme court was that residence as to both
domestic and foreign corporations is only in the county where the corporation
maintains its registered office and agent. Then in State ex rel. Stamm v. Mayfield,17
the court said of the James case, "To the extent that it holds that the last sen-
tence of section 351.375 is applicable to foreign corporations, State ex rel. White-
man v. James is disapproved." The Mayfield case involved venue over a foreign
insurance company and an individual defendant based on the foreign insurance
corporation's residence, alleged to be in St. Louis. But the insurance company
had no registered office in the state, although it did maintain an office in St. Louis.
The court found venue proper because the corporation law does not apply to in-
surance companiesis and section 351.625, RSMo 1949, dealing with the manner
in which a foreign corporation may change the address of its registered office did
not incorporate the last sentence of 351.375 which had to do with the "manner"
of registering the office.19
15. State ex rel. Whiteman v. James, 364 Mo. 589, 265 S.W. 298 (En Banc
1954).
16. Under § 351.015(l), RSMo 1963 Supp., "corporation" is defined to in-
lude "corporations organized under this chapter or subject to some or all of the
provisions of this chapter except a foreign corporation" unless the context other-
wise requires.
17. State ex rel. Stamm v. Mayfield, 340 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. En Banc 1960).
18. Insurance companies are among those to which Missouri's General and
Business Corporation Law does not apply. § 351.690, RSMo 1959, provides:
The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable to existing corporations
as follows:
(2) No provisions of this law, other than those mentioned in sub-
division (1), shall be applicable to banks, trust companies, in-
surance companies, building and loan associations, savings bank
and safe deposit companies, mortgage loan companies, and non-
profit corporations; ...
19. "Section 351.375 applies to foreign corporations only to the extent that
351.625 incorporates it by reference, and the last sentence of 351.375 which was
the basis of the James decision is not properly includable in the reference." State
ex rel. Stamm v. Mayfield, supra note 17, at 633.
The reason that § 351.375 applies only to domestic corporations in the absence
of incorporation by reference is that § 351.375 refers to "corporation" and under
1964]
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Therefore following the Mayfield case Missouri lawyers were left in doubt
as to what satisfied the residence requirement of 508.010 when a foreign corpora-
tion's Missouri residence was to serve as the basis for venue over several defend-
ants. 20 As to domestic corporations the Brown case remained and as to those cor-
porations exempted from the act the Henning case seemed to set the rule.
The stage was set for State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensenal where an original pro-
ceeding in mandamus was brought in the Missouri Supreme Court to require the
circuit judge to retain jurisdiction of an individual defendant. It was held that
venue was improper where the suit had been brought in Jackson County against
an individual defendant, who resided in Franklin County, and a foreign business
corporation whose registered office and registered agent were maintained in the
City of St. Louis, even though it had offices and conducted business in Jackson
County. The majority of the court indicated the Mayfield opinion should not have
disapproved the James case in so far as it held that 351.375 applied to foreign
corporations. The fact that 351.375 was not incorporated by reference into the
statutes dealing with foreign corporations was held not to be controlling as the
court found other basis for concluding that the registered office of a foreign cor-
poration would serve as the only residence of such a corporation for purposes of
the venue statute. The majority looked to 351.620,22 which requires a foreign cor-
poration to maintain a registered office and registered agent, and decided the pur-
pose of the statute was to give such a "corporation a fixed, definite and certain
location where a representative of the corporation may be found." It reasoned that
this location in law amounted to residence of the corporation in this state and
that only one such residence is required. The court further said it was good busi-
ness practice and properly protected the rights of the individual defendants to so
construe the statutes. It pointed out that otherwise the individual defendant had
a difficult time ascertaining whether venue was proper as to it when the corpora-
§ 351.015(1) supra, such language would not apply to foreign corporations unless
the context otherwise required. Section 351.625 specifically applies to foreign cor-
porations and refers to § 351.375 as to the manner of changing the registered
office or agent, but 351.625 says nothing regarding what should constitute a for-
eign corporation's residence in Missouri nor does it refer to 351.375 to determine
that matter.
20. It was suggested that Mayfield, by dicta, raised the question as to whether
the rule of the Whiteman case applied to a foreign corporation and the author sug-
gested, "so if you have a case involving a foreign corporation why you might be
able to escape the harshness of the Whiteman rule." Smith & Milholland, Recent
Developments in the Missouri Law of Torts, 36 MACA BULL. 18 (Fall 1962).
21. State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen, swpra note 1.
22. § 351.620, RSMo 1959 provides in part:
1. Each foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this state
shall have and continuously maintain in this state:(1) A registered office which may be, but need not be, the same as
its place of business in this state;(2) A registered agent, which agent may be either an individual,
resident in this state, whose business office is identical with
such registered office, or a corporation authorized to transact
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tion's residence served as the basis for venue under 503.010(2) because the ques-
tion would be one of fact whether or not the corporation was doing business as
usual and customary in that county. Thus the residence of a foreign business corpo-
ration is now determined in the same manner as the residence of a domestic corpora-
tion, by merely looking to the Secretary of State's office to see where the corpora-
tion's registered office is located. The only difference between the two is the stat-
utory road of interpretation which leads to the result.
Judges Hyde and Storckman dissented from the majority's application of
Missouri statutes in the Jensen case. The dissenters agreed that the Mayfield
case did not control because that case had to do with a foreign insurance company.
But they again asserted in Judge Hyde's opinion that the proper construction of
351.375 is that it "only adds another office to those where service can be made
and venue established."2 3
The dissenters felt that the problem sentence of 351.375 standing alone falls
short of precluding any other location or residence for the purpose of venue and
service of summons. 24 Further the dissent notes that there did not appear to be any
intent to change the venue laws radically through the enactment of the section
in question. From looking to all the statutes possibly bearing on the problem and
construing them in pari materia so as to give as full effect as possible to each,
they felt there was no intent to change the rule of the Henning case.25
The dissenters queried what would result if a corporation failed to maintain
a registered office or agent in Missouri as contemplated by 351.375 and 351.625,
there being no provision for alternate venue. The dissent then rests with a
recognition that hardship cases are bound to occur regarding venue but that the
legislature could provide a remedy to the problem by enacting legislation similar
to that given the federal courts under the doctrine of forum non conveniens where-
in courts would have the power, in the interest of justice, to transfer cases to a
different county when such a transfer would provide a place of trial more convenient
to litigants and witnesses.26
23. State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen, supra note 1, at 351.
24. "'The location or residence of any corporation shall be deemed for all
purposes to be in the county where its registered office is maintained.' The O'Keefe
and Whiteman cases seem to regard the provision as if it reads 'for all purposes
of venue,' but it does not have that effect. At best, venue is only one of several
purposes involved. . . . [The] sentence should be considered as if it read: 'The
location or residence of any corporation shall be deemed for the purpose of venue
to be in the county where its registered office is maintained.' The language of the
provision standing alone falls short of precluding any other location or residence
for the purpose of venue and service of summons." State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen,
supra note 1, at 353.
25. State ex rel. Henning v. Williams, supra note 7.
26. The dissent was referring to 28 U.S.CA. § 1406(a), which provides:
The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the
wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice,
transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1404 also provides relief in the interest of convenience as follows:
(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice,
a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought.
1964]
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The reasoning of the dissent is appealing as there appears to have been no in-
tent expressed in the General Business and Corporation Law to change the rules
or create new ones regarding venue.27 It seems proper to state that had such an
intent existed it would clearly have been set out. However, the majority result
gives Missouri lawyers a definite and certain residence where suit must be brought
when either a domestic or foreign corporation's Missouri residence is to serve as
the basis for venue in a multi-defendant case where a codefendant is an individ-
ual. In a profession which is plagued by much uncertainty, this result will surely be
beneficial; however, the fact that many foreign corporations have their registered
offices in St. Louis or Kansas City might cause trial inconvenience, and the dis-
sent's suggestion concerning a forum non conveniens transfer statute in Missouri
seems an excellent remedy to the problem. Uncertainty remains where the residence
of an exempted corporation is asserted as the basis for venue or where a corpora-
tion has failed to maintain a registered office. As to the exempted corporation, the
Mayfield case establishes that residence remains a question of fact as to the
county in which such corporation conducts its usual and customary business.
Whether the "usual and customary place of business" rule will satisfy residence
requirements when a corporation fails to maintain a registered office remains to
be seen. Under the present rule it would seem if a corporation has no registered
office it must be considered a nonresident.
These problems could of course be avoided by suing in the county where one
of the other defendants resides. But if the other defendant happens to be a non-
resident individual and the corporate defendant fails to maintain a registered
office, perhaps suit could be maintained in any county in the state under
508.010(4).2.
WADE H. FoRD, Ja.
(b) Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties, any action, suit
or proceeding of a civil nature or any motion or hearing thereof, may
be transferred, in the discretion of the court, from the division in
which pending to any other division in the same district. Transfer
of proceedings in rem brought by or on behalf of the United States
may be transferred under this section without the consent of the
United States where all other parties request transfer.
(c) A district court may order any civil action to be tried at any place
within the division in which it is pending.
27. § 351.690, RSMo 1959.
28. § 508.010(4), RSMo 1959 provides, 'When all defendants are nonresidents
of the state, suit may be brought in any county in this state ......
[Vol. 29
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PROCEDURE-MISSOURI-USE OF DEPOSITIONS AS EVIDENCE
Pettus v. Casey,
Plaintiff was allegedly injured when his automobile was struck by defendant's
delivery truck. Defendant's truck was being driven by his employee, Walton.
Although Walton was present in the courtroom, his deposition was read into
evidence by the plaintiff. The defendant's objection was overruled, and neither
party called the deponent as a witness. Following a judgment of $25,000 for plain-
tiff, the trial court sustained the defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground
it had erred in permitting the deposition to be read into evidence while the de-
ponent was present.
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the order granting a new trial. The
court said that reading the deposition into evidence when the deponent was pres-
ent in the courtroom had the effect of denying and preventing the cross-examina-
tion of the witness to which defendant was entitled as a matter of right.
The confusion in the case apparently arose from the substantial adoption of
federal rule 26(b),2 regarding the scope of examination for depositions, into Mis-
souri rule 57.013 without also adopting federal rule 26(d) 4 regarding the use of
depositions. Rather than adopting federal rule 26(d),, which clearly explicates the
uses of depositional statements, Missouri incorporated two former statutory pro-
visions" into rules 57.297 and 57.44,8 which govern the use of depositions in Mis-
souri. The two rules9 are not as clear and precise as their federal counterpart,10
and it may have been thought that with the new scope of examination and other
changes made by the Missouri rules the language dealing with the use of deposi-
tions might be given a new construction. However, the decision in the principal
case leaves little doubt that the supreme court intends to follow the case-law
already established in regard to the statutory provisions"- now embodied in the
Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure.
Although the Missouri rules12 do not distinguish between deponents as parties
and non-parties, as do the federal rules,"' the results are closely parallel. A party's
deposition may be used as an admission whether he is in court and ready to testify
1. 358 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1962).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
3. Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.01. This rule replaces § 492.080, RSMo 1959.
4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d).
5. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d). § 2 dearly provides that the deposition of an ad-
verse party may be used for any purpose. § 3 clearly provides that the deposition
of a witness may be used by any party for any purpose upon any one of five enu-
merated occurrences, such as sickness, incarceration, etc.
6. §§ 492.400, 492.570, RSMo 1959.
7. Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.29. Taken from § 492.400, RSMo 1959.
8. Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.44. Taken from § 492.570, RSMo 1959.
9. Mo. Civ. P. 57.29, 57.44.
10. See note 5 supra.
11. §§ 492.400, 492.570, RSMo 1959.
12. Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.29, 57.44.
13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d).
19641
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or not.-' The deposition of a non-party witness may not be used as evidence, if
the witness is present at the trial.15 However, the presence of a witness in court
subsequent to the date on which his deposition was read will not justify its ex-
clusion, barring any collusion.1 Also, the deposition of an agent may be used as
evidence, even though the deponent is present, if it qualifies as an admission of
the agent's principal, and the principal is a party to the suit.'.
The results reached by the Missouri construction are in accord with the major-
ity of jurisdictions. Most courts permit the use of depositions as evidence, although
the deponent is present, if the deponent is a party,' 8 but refuse to do so if he is
not a party.' 9 There are states, however, that permit the use of depositions, when
the deponent is present, although the deponent is not a party.20 There are also
several interesting variations of the foregoing general rules.21
14. Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337 Mo. 298, 85 S.W.2d 400 (1935); Kneezle v.
Scott County Milling Co., 113 S.W.2d 817 (Spr. Mo. App. 1938); Dawes v. Wil-
liams, 328 Mo. 680, 40 S.W.2d 644 (1931); Bogie v. Nolan, 96 Mo. 85, 9 S.W. 14
(1888); Wilt v. Moody, 254 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. 1953); Cox v. Reynolds, 18 S.W.2d
575 (St. L. Mo. App. 1929).
15. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Ullman, 137 Mo. 543, 38 S.W. 458 (1896);
Schmitz v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 119 Mo. 256, 24 S.W. 472 (1893); Winegar v.
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 163 S.W.2d 357 (K.C. Mo. App. 1942); Vest v. Kresge,
213 S.W. 165 (K.C. Mo. App. 1919); Maplewood Planing Mill & Stair Co. v. Pen-
nant Constr. Co., 344 S.W.2d 629 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961).
16. Benjamin v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 133 Mo. 274, 34 S.W. 590 (1896).
17. Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 232 Mo. App. 1071, 115 S.W.2d 121 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1938).
18. Cusumano v. Pitzer Trucking Co., 209 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1961); Musellam v.
Flowers, 211 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1961); Dunahoo v. Brooks, 128 So.2d 485 (Ala. 1961);
Higgs' Ex'x v. Higgs' Ex'x, 286 Ky. 236, 150 S.W.2d 681 (1941); Hurtel v. Albert
Cohn, Inc., 5 Cal.2d 145, 52 P.2d 922 (1936); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. McCoy, 261
Ky. 435, 87 S.W.2d 921 (1935); Raidt v. Blount, 294 Ky. 172, 171 S.W.2d 233(1943); Ray v. Henderson, 27 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1963); Robinson v. North Amer-
ican Life & Cas. Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1963); Rogers v. Yarbrough Const. Co.,
291 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1956); Southern Pac. Co. v. Cavallo, 323
P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1958); Stevens' Adm'r v. Watt, 266 Ky. 608, 99 S.W.2d 753 (1936);
Superior Forwarding Co. v. Sikes, 349 S.W.2d 818 (Ark. 1961); Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n v. Pillow, 268 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1954); White v. Wal-
strom, 118 N.W.2d 578 (Iowa 1962); Wilson v. Gregory, 313 Ky. 326, 231 S.W.2d
14 (1950).
19. Chase v. Watson, 294 P.2d 801 (Okla. 1956); Cote v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 86 N.H. 238, 166 A. 279 (1933); Davies v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Co., 68
N.E.2d 571 (Ohio 1938); Goldstein v . Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 23 N.J.
Super. 126, 92 A.2d 637 (1952); Henry's Adm'x v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 282 Ky.
101, 137 S.W.2d 1081 (1940); Higgs' Ex'x v. Higgs' Ex'x, 286 Ky. 236, 150 S.W.2d
681 (1941); Mobile Infirmary v. Eberlein, 119 So.2d 8 (Ala. 1960); Nauts v.
Stahl, 128 Ohio St. 115, 190 N.E. 242 (1934); Nolty's Adm'r v. Fultz, 261 Ky. 516,
88 S.W.2d 35 (1935); Stevens' Adm'r v. Watt, 266 Ky. 608, 99 S.W.2d 753 (1936).
20. Chandler v. Smith, 50 Ga. App. 667, 179 S.E. 395 (1935); International
Harvester Co. v. Sartain, 32 Tenn. App. 425, 222 S.W.2d 854 (1949); Jacobs v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 341 Ill. App. 293, 93 N.E.2d 516 (1950); Russ
Mitchell, Inc. v. Houston Pipe Line Co., 219 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1949).
21. In Florida, a deposition is admissible into evidence when it appears that
the memory of the deponent was clearer, at the time the deposition was taken,
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The principal case reflects the traditional importance associated with safe-
guarding the right of cross-examination in Missouri,2 2 accompanied by the fact
that depositions have always been considered secondary evidence, not to be used
when the viva voce testimony of a deponent is available. Undoubtedly, the pro-
visions in both the Missouri23 and the federal rules24 providing for the use of dep-
ositions when the deponent is unavailable for certain enumerated reasons reflects
a preference for oral testimony given in open court before the trier of facts.
Such a preference for oral testimony does not work an unnecessary hardship
upon either party. If the deponent is present in court, he may be called to the
stand and the beneficial information may be elicited from the witness. If counsel
is reluctant to call the witness in fear of damaging cross-examination, there yet
remains the possibility of joining the deponent as a party to the suit in some
cases. In the principal case, plaintiff could have sued the employee (deponent)
and the employer as codefendants. The deposition of the employee would then have
been that of a party-opponent and could have been read into evidence.
RAY E. KLINGINSMITH
PRODUCT LIABILITY-MISSOURI-IMPLIED
WARRANTY-THE END OF PRIVITY
Morrow v. Caloric Appiance Corporaton
Mrs. Morrow, the plaintiff, purchased a gas range and oven from H. R. Lewis,
an appliance dealer in East Prairie, Missouri. Mr. Lewis had purchased the range
from the Uregas Company in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, which was a distributor
for defendant Caloric Appliance Corporation. Before Mr. Lewis had his employee
install the range it was inspected for any defects and was found to be in good
order. The employee installed the range in plaintiff's house and connected the
gas line to the range, and then made a further check to be sure that the range
was in proper working order.
In Georgia, the admission of a deposition, when the deponent is present at
the trial, is largely within the discretion of the trial judge. Chandler v. Smith,
50 Ga. App. 667, 179 S.E. 395 (1935).
In Illinois, any objection as to the deponents availability must be raised at
the time the deposition is taken. If no objection is raised at that time, the dep-
osition may be read at the trial. Jacobs v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 341 Ill. App 293,
93 N.E.2d 516 (1950).
22. Gurley v. St. Louis Transit, 259 S.W.2d 895 (St. L. Mo. App. 1924); Hof-
burg v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 283 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1955); Sconce v.
Jones, 343 Mo. 362, 121 S.W.2d 777 (1938); State ex rel. DeWeese v. Morris, 359
Mo. 194, 221 S.W.2d 206 (1949); State v. Laspy, 298 S.W.2d 357 (Mo. 1957);
State v. Thompson, 280 S.W.2d 838 (Mo. 1955).
23. Mo. R. Civ. 57.29, 57.44.
24. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d).
1. Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963).
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Plaintiff used the range for cooking without mishap for five or six days. Then
while using the range she heard a hissing noise and discovered flames coming up
and around a pan on one of the top burners. She extinguished the fire before any
damage occurred.
The same employee who installed the range checked it and found some of the
valves to be defective. He corrected this defect, checked the range, and restored
it to operation. About a week later the same thing occurred on the left side of
the range and the plaintiff's entire house and personal belongings were consumed
in the resulting fire. The installing employee testified at the trial that in his opinion
the fire was caused by faulty valves used in the construction of the gas range.
The Morrows submitted their case on the sole theory that the defendant,
Caloric Appliance Corporation, impliedly warranted that the range was reason-
ably fit and suitable as a gas range for home use. Defendant contended that in
the absence of privity of contract there can be no implied warranty by the man-
ufacturer. At the trial the jury awarded plaintiff $3,700. Defendant appealed to
the Springfield Court of Appeals and that court transferred 2 the appeal to the
Missouri Supreme Court on issues involving the due process clause of the United
States Constitution which are not discussed herein.3
The supreme court isolated the issue in the following terms:
The precise question now presented to this court (for the first time, insofar
as we have found) is whether privity of contract is necessary in order for
an ultimate consumer to recover from a manufacturer on an implied
warranty, or perhaps stated more frankly, whether a manufacturer of an
instrumentality which is imminently dangerous if defectively manufactured
is to be held to strict liability upon proof of the defect and of causation.= 4
The court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff and held that privity of
contract is not a prerequisite to a recovery against a manufacturer for defects in
a mechanical product which is imminently dangerous when defective.
When a defect in a manufactured product causes injury the most logical thing
to do is to look to the manufacturer as a source of compensation for the damages.
Prior to this decision it was only the exceptional case that allowed the injured
party to recover damages from the manufacturer in the absence of privity of con-
tractY
The first and most notable exception to the requirement of privity of con-
tract for recovery from the manufacturer of a defective product was found in the
cases involving food and drink. The first case in Missouri allowing recovery from
the producer of a packaged food or drink, without privity was Madouros v. Kan-
sas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co.6 where plaintiff sought to recover for injuries
2. Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 362 S.W.2d 282 (Spr. Mo. App. 1963).
3. For a discussion of this aspect see Anderson, Personal Jurisdiction over
Outsiders, 28 Mo. L. REv. 336, at 372 (1963).
4. Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., supra note 1, at 51.
5. For a comprehensive discussion of this entire area see Roberts, Implied
Warranties-the Privity Rile and Strict Liability-the Non-food Cases, 27 Mo. L.
Rnv. 194 (1962), cited by the court in the Morrow decision.
6. 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936).
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resulting from the partial consumption by plaintiff of a bottle of Coca-Cola con-
taining a decayed mouse. The Kansas City Court of Appeals held that since de-
fendant had bottled goods for human consumption, defendant impliedly warranted
that the goods were fit for human consumption regardless of privity of contract.
This exception has been consistently reaffirmed by the Missouri courts of appeals.7
Even though well established in the courts of appeals this exception was not
adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court until the case of Midwest Game Co. v.
MYF.A. Milling Co.8 A fish food manufactured by defendant was deficient in cer-
tain ingredients essential to a "complete" fish food, and because it was not "com-
plete," plaintiff had costly losses. The court held that the general rule that there
is an implied warranty of fitness on food packaged and processed for human con-
sumption is controlling.9 Even though there was no foreign matter present, the
court said that trade usage and custom as to "complete" fish food raises an im-
plied warranty that the product does in fact contain all ingredients necessary to
make it "complete." The court extended the food and drink exception to food
for animals on the theory that where food is supplied for animals, in something
other than its raw state, the exception applies also to food consumed by animals.
The court has since reaffirmed this position.10
In the Morrow case the court relies on the line of food and drink cases as an
indication of the way the law in Missouri has been moving toward the removal
of the privity requirement. The court points out that the Midwest Game v. M.F.A.
Milling Co. case held that implied warranty of fitness "should at least be extended
to food for consumption by animals. . . ." (emphasis added), suggesting that it
would ultimately be extended further.
The food and drink exception indicated a trend in the law in Missouri, but
the case of Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co." gave strong direction to Mis-
souri law toward the decision in the Morrow case. Plaintiff had used the defend-
ant's product "Tide" in her restaurant for washing dishes and developed a skin
infection. It was held that plaintiff could recover from defendant manufacturer
regardless of privity of contract. The court caused subsequent confusion as to
what was the basis for its decision by referring to a statement on the Tide box
"Tide is kind to your hands" which has led some to believe the case was decided
on express warranty. - Any controversy that may have arisen out of this con-
7. Representative cases: Nemela v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 104 S.W.2d
773 (St. L. Mo. App. 1937) (bugs in Coca-Cola); McNicholas v. Continental
Baking Co., 112 S.W.2d 849 (St. L. Mo. App. 1938) (glass in bread); Carter v.
St. Louis Dairy Co., 139 S.W.2d 1025 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940) (glass in milk);
Helms v. General Baking Co., 164 S.W.2d 150 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942) (pieces of
steel in bread); Foley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 215 S.W.2d 314 (St. L. Mo. App.
1948) (tacks in Coca-Cola); Strawn v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 234 S.W.2d 223
(K.C. Mo. App. 1950) (cigar in Coca-Cola); Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
285 S.W.2d 53 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955) (worms in Coca-Cola).
8. 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959).
9. Citing Carter v. St. Louis Dairy Co., supra note 7.
10. Albers Milling Co. v. Carney, 341 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1960).
11. 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (St. IL. Ct. App. 1952).
12. Professor Anderson in his comprehensive article, Observations on tke Law
of Implied Warranty of Quality in Missouri: 1960, 1960 WAsH. U.L.Q. 71, takes
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fusion was ended for practical purposes by the court in the Morrow case when
the court declared that in the Worley case plaintiff "was entitled to invoke the
theory of implied warranty . . . without privity of contract."''1 Thus construed as
a case of implied, rather than express warranty, the Worley case is perhaps the
strongest prior Missouri decision in favor of the position taken in the Morrow
case. Obviously the Worley case was an extension of the abandonment of privity
beyond the food and drink exception.
In the course of development of the law in this area there have been two fed-
eral district court cases, applying Missouri law, which reached curious results.
In McIntyre v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co.14 plaintiff was injured when
an unopened bottle of Coca-Cola exploded. The court held that this was a case
of implied warranty of merchantability on a non-food product and under existing
Missouri law recovery for breach of an implied warranty could be maintained only
in food and drink cases and in cases involving a sale of goods for a particular
purpose.1 5 In Ross v. Pkhiip Morris Company, Ltd.8 plaintiff sought damages
for injuries allegedly resulting from smoking cigarettes produced by defendant,
basing recovery on implied warranty. The court first denied recovery on the
grounds that the food and drink exception had not been adopted as law by the
Missouri Supreme Court and in all other cases privity was required. In a subse-
quent unpublished opinionl 7 the same court reversed itself on the basis of Mid-
west Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co. wherein the Missouri Supreme Court had
adopted the food and drink exception to the privity requirement. s The federal
court felt this new case included cigarettes intended for human consumption. The
court in Morrow discounted these and other federal cases in determining the true
state of Missouri law.
For a number of years the major block in the development of implied warranty
in Missuori was State ex rel. Jones Store v. Shain.19 Plaintiff was seeking to re-
cover from the retailer for injuries from dye that faded out of a blouse purchased
by plaintiff. The supreme court, en banc, held that for there to be an implied
warranty in the sale of a non-food or drink article defendant must have sold the
the position that the Worley case was decided on express warranty and therefore
was not really an extension of Missouri law on this subject. He logically bases this
conclusion on the reference by the court in Worley to the printed matter on the
box of "Tide," and the decision in Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note
7, where the St. Louis Court of Appeals refers to Worley as decided on express war-
ranty. An annotation in 75 A;L.R.2d 39, 87, treats the Worley case as based on
implied warranty. However on pages 82 and 83 the same annotation refers to
Worley as a case of express warranty. To further confuse the issue the court in
Worley made extensive reference to Chapter IX in WILLISTON, SALES, which is en-
titled "Implied Warranties of Quality."
13. Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., supra note 1, at 52.
14. 85 F.Supp. 708 (W.D. Mo. 1949); see 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 71, at 78.
15. State ex rel. Jones Store v. Shain, 352 Mo. 630, 179 S.W.2d 19 (1944);
Zesch v. Abrasive Co., 353 Mo. 558, 183 S.W.2d 140 (1944).
16. 164 F.Supp. 683 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
17. No. 9494 (W.D. Mo., Oct. 22, 1959).
18. Supra note 8.
19. Supra note 15.
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product for a particular purpose with the buyer relying on the seller's judgment
that it was fit for that purpose. The particular purpose had to be some special
one outside of the ordinary use of the product.20 The Shain case was disregarded
in the Morrow decision since it did not involve privity of contract, but rather was
a case against the immediate retailer of the blouse and therefore distinguishable.
In Smith v. Ford Motor Co.21 recovery of damages was denied for structural
and mechanical defects in an automobile purchased by plaintiff. Plaintiff contended
defendant had impliedly warranted that the automobile was safe for use and free
from defects in manufacturing. No property loss or personal injuries were involved
and recovery was only sought on the ground that the car was "a lemon." The
court held that where recovery based on implied warranty had been granted in
the past, an element of tort with personal injuries had been present, citing Worley
v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co.22 The court in Morrow makes little or no attempt
to distinguish the Smith case, probably because in Morrow there was actual
property loss caused by the defects.
In Morrow the court points also to the trend in other states to apply implied
warranty without privity of contract. Two notable cases cited are Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc. involving a defective automobile,23 and Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc. involving a defective power tool.24 Both cases contain
an extensive discussion of implied warranty and its background, and both are
landmark decisions in their respective states, establishing implied warranty with-
out privity of contract.2 5 In Morrow the court shows that it intends to follow this
forward looking trend.
The importance of the Morrow decision to Missouri law is significant. The
case is strong since there was only property damage and the court still felt com-
pelled to obviate the necessity of privity of contract beyond the previously exist-
ing exceptions. The court met the question squarely and refused to draw any
arbitrary or synthetic distinctions between the mouse in the Coca-Cola, defectively
processed food for animals, and an imminently dangerous defective automobile or
gas range.
The effect of the decision is limited since both in posing the issue and in
deciding the case, the court limited the effect of its holding to recovery for injury
only from those products which are imminently dangerous when defective and
used in the manner in which they were intended to be used. The court shows the
logical progression to the Morrow decision by pointing out the exceptions to the
privity requirement previously established in Missouri. Worley v. Procter & Gam-
ble Mfg. Co.,26 if viewed in retrospect as a case of implied warranty, definitely
20. See also Zesch v. Abrasive Co., supra note 15.
21. 327 S.W.2d 535 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959).
22. Supra note 11.
23. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); 27 Mo. L. REv. 194, 198 (1962).
24. 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962); 28 Mo. L. REv. 663.
25. Other cases also mentioned: Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12
N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963); State Farm Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Anderson-Weber Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961); and 50 New
Walden, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co., 39 Misc.2d 460, 241 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1963).
26. Supra note 11.
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shows the trend in the Missouri decisions toward the position taken in the Morrow
case. It is still a significant step from allowing a recovery for personal injuries to
allowing a recovery for property loss only. It is here, in allowing recovery without
privity of contract for property loss alone, that the Morrow decision takes on its
real significance.
The court states that it is motivated in making this decision by a desire to
modify the harsh results of the antiquated doctrine of caveat emptor in the mod-
ern world of mass consumption of manufactured products. No wiser or more just
reason could be found in light of the many injustices that have occurred in the
past when that doctrine was followed without qualification.
DENNIS W. SMITH
PROPERTY-FORFEITURE PROVISIONS IN MISSOURI
INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACTS
Plymoutk Securities Co. v. Joknson1
Domyan v. Dornin2
Poole v. Roloffs
An installment land contract typically allows a purchaser of land to take im-
mediate possession prior to obtaining legal title to the land. The vendor retains
legal title as security until the full purchase price is paid. Prior to the final pay-
ment made pursuant to the contract, the purchaser has only an equitable interest
in the land. Upon receipt of the final payment, the vendor is required to convey
the land to the purchaser thereby vesting legal title in the purchaser and extin-
guishing any security interest which the vendor has in the land.
In the event of a purchaser's failure to comply with the terms of an install-
ment land contract, the typical contract provides that all prior payments made
by the purchaser may be retained by the vendor as liquidated damages for the
purchaser's non-performance. Such a forfeiture provision, if strictly enforced by
the courts, can, when viewed from the standpoint of a purchaser, lead to a harsh
and oppressive result, viz., the provision for liquidated damages may in reality
become a provision for a penalty.
The effect given to such contracts in the United States in general and in
Missouri in particular has been discussed in Porter, Installment Contracts for the
Sale of Land in Missouri.4 The purpose of this note is to serve as supplement to
Mr. Porter's discussion of the effect given to the forfeiture provisions in install-
ment land contracts by the Missouri courts.
1. 335 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. 1960).
2. 356 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. 1962).
3. 361 S.W.2d 340 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962).
4. 24 Mo. L. REv. 240 (1959).
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Plymouthk Securities Co. v. JoknsonP arose over an installment land contract
between Plymouth Securities Company, a business trust (frequently referred to
as a Massachusetts or a common law trust) ,6 and defendants Johnson and Maysack.
The contract was for the sale of approximately 180 acres of land, the principal
asset of the trust, which the trustees were authorized to subdivide into lots and
improve "for residences, businesses, cemetery, park or other purposes." The land,
located in St. Louis County, was known as Laurel Hills Cemetery.
By the terms of the contract, defendants, as Purchasers, agreed to organize
and establish a sales agency to sell grave lots, crypts and niches, having minimum
gross sales of $100,000 for each of the years 1946 and 1947, $150,000 for each of
the years 1948, 1949 and 1950, and $200,000 for each year thereafter until the
purchase price had been paid in full to Plymouth Securities Company.
The purchase price was $225,000 and the assumption of all of the Seller's liabil-
ities. In payment of the $225,000, Purchasers agreed to set aside and pay to Seller
an amount equal to ten per cent of the gross sales price of all lots sold.7 Such pay-
ments were to be made "on or before the 15th day of each month for all lots, on
which deeds have been delivered during the calendar month next preceding." A
grace period was provided in the event of failure to meet the minimum quota of
sales in any one year. The Purchasers were allowed six months immediately follow-
ing the close of the year in which the default occurred, during which time they
were required "to make all payments and quotas current."
Legal and record title to all the land was to remain vested in Seller until the
purchase price of $225,000 was paid in full and until the contract was fully per-
formed by the Purchasers. Article VI of the contract further provided that the
Seller could cancel all rights of the Purchasers "in event of the failure on the part
of Purchasers to comply with all of the terms of this contract to be by them per-
formed," and that "all property and improvements and other assets shall there-
upon revert to Seller as compensation or damages for the use of its property and
as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty for the breach of this agreement."
The vice-president of Plymouth Securities Company notified defendants as
of February 18, 1957, that there had been "a failure on the part of Purchasers to
comply with all of the terms" of the contract and that "the Seller will, after sixty
(60) days from date hereof, cancel all rights of the Purchasers under the afore-
mentioned agreement for Purchasers' failure to comply with the agreement."
Plaintiffs filed suit December 11, 1957, to eject the defendant from the premises
for their failure to comply with all the terms of the contract as provided by
Article VI. In answer, defendants pleaded that plaintiffs as a class had received
benefits under the contract in excess of $175,000; that plaintiffs had not tendered
5. Supra note 1.
6. For a detailed discussion of the nature of business trusts see Annot., 156
A.L.R. 22 (1945).
7. In Fratcher, Trusts and Succession in Missouri, 27 Mo. L. REv. 93, 114
(1962), notice was taken that this case made no mention of the usual rule that a
trustee may not sell trust property on credit without express authorization by the
terms of the trust. The authorities cited by Mr. Fratcher did not involve business
trusts, and it is doubtful whether this "usual rule" applies to business trusts.
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a return of the benefits received; that after the purported cancellation of the con-
tract on April 20, 1957, defendants had made several payments under the terms
of the contract which plaintiffs had accepted and retained; and therefore, that
plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief requested. Defendants also counterclaimed
for specific performance of the contract.
The trial court found that the defendant Purchasers had paid plaintiffs $124,-
294.34 on the original $225,000.00 purchase price and that at least $70,000.00 had
been paid by defendants on obligations of Plymouth which they had assumed.
The trial court further found that defendants had offered to pay plaintiffs the
balance due under the terms of the contract. Other evidence tended to show that
the land remaining had a reasonable market value in excess of $300,000.
Plaintiffs were also found to have accepted payments under the terms of the
contract subsequent to the February 18, 1957, letter, which gave notice of the
cancellation of the contract sixty days therefrom.
Accordingly, the trial court ordered that plaintiffs' causes of action be dis-
missed and that defendants pay plaintiffs $100,705.66 ($225,000.00 less $124,294.34)
within ten days after the order became final. Plaintiffs were ordered to take all
steps necessary to carry out their obligations under the contract concurrently
with the payment by defendants.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court contending that the trial
court erred in refusing to declare a cancellation of the contract and eject the de-
fendants from the premises for failure to comply with all the terms of the con-
tract as provided. The supreme court affirmed holding that the trial court prop-
erly refused to declare a cancellation of the purchase contract for the default of
the Purchasers. The acceptance of payments on the purchase price after the de-
fault waived such default as to the time of payment. Furthermore, the covenants
which plaintiffs claimed were breached were chiefly ancillary to the promise to
pay the purchase price and the present value of the property far exceeded the
balance due on the purchase price. Also, defendant Purchasers, upon payment
of the balance due under the contract, were allowed specific enforcement of the con-
tract notwithstanding their being in default as to the time of payment of install-
ments under the contract.
This case thereby seems illustrative of certain principles suggested in Porter,
Installment Contracts for the Sale of Land in Missouri.s There, the strictness of
the language used by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Atkinson v. Smothersg was
questioned. In that case, the court said:
The principle is firmly established that when one goes into possession
under a contract of purchase, and then makes default in the payment
of the purchase price in accordance with the terms of the contract, he
may be turned out by the vendor in an action of ejectment.
This language was questioned in light of the fact that the court cited for sup-
port only cases in which the forfeiture consisted of merely a down payment made
8. Sitpra note 4.
9. 291 S.W.2d 645, 648 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956).
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to bind the agreement and not a forfeiture of other payments made prior to de-
fault. The statement was made by Mr. Porter:
Considering the extreme penalty possible when all payments are forfeited,
it would seem highly improbable that the court intended to apply the
doctrine of the cases it cited as strictly as indicated.'0
That statement would seem to have been well warranted in view of the prin-
cipal case where the court said:
[If the amount or value of the property stipulated as liquidated damages
for breach of contract is greatly disproportionate to the ensuing loss, the
court will construe it to be a penalty and restrict the damages recovered to
those actually suffered. . . . The present value of the property far exceeds
the balance due on the purchase price. In these circumstances the court
properly refused to declare a forfeiture."
Also, by holding that by accepting payments of the purchase price after such
payments were in default plaintiff waived the terms of the contract as to time of
payment, the Plymouth Securities Co. case seemingly illustrates the increasing
importance of waiver in regard to land installment contracts. The Porter article
notes:
[T~he issue of waiver . . . has become increasingly important. This has
been in large measure due to the convenience waiver presents to the
courts which have been forced to deal with the strict forfeiture provisions.
If the court can find, even on slight grounds, that there has been a waiver
of the strict provisions, the tendency is to seize that as a means for reliev-
ing against the forfeiture. 12
This language was used in emphasizing the importance of waiver in allowing
a purchaser in default under an installment land contract to maintain an action
for specific performance of the contract. To illustrate the point, the case of Bo-
gad v. Wachter's was cited. This is the same authority that was subsequently
relied upon in the Plymouth Securities Co. case in holding that there had been a
waiver of the terms of the contract as to the time of payment. Thus, the fact that
the issue of specific performance arose by counterclaim in an action for ejectment
against a purchaser in default rather than in a specific performance action orig-
inally brought by a purchaser in default would seem to make no difference. The
issue of waiver seems equally applicable in either situation.
Attention should also be given to the court's conditioning its award of specific
performance to defendants upon payment by defendants of the balance due under
the contract. It should be noticed that defendants had previously offered to pay
this amount to plaintiffs in order that the contract could become fully executed.
10. Porter, Installment Contracts for the Sale of Land in Missouri, supra note
4, at 254.
11. Plymouth Securities Co. v. Johnson, supra note 1, at 152, citing Bogad v.
Wachter, 365 Mo. 426, 283 S.W.2d 609 (1955).
12. Porter, Installment Contracts for the Sale of Land in Missouri, supra note
4, at 249. Cf. GILL, MissouRi TITLEs § 1659 (4th ed. 1960).
13. 365 Mo. 426, 283 S.W.2d 609 (1955).
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The importance of these facts are illustrated by the later case of Domyan v.
Dornin,14 where the Missouri Supreme Court denied the right of the sellers under
an installment contract to eject the purchaser and retake the land pursuant to a
forfeiture clause which provided for the retaining of payments and the retaking
of possession by seller in case of default by purchaser in making payments at the
time provided by the contract. The court held that seller had waived the require-
ment of timely payment by the acceptance of a payment of interest on a delin-
quent payment. However, purchaser was denied specific performance of the con-
tract due to his inability to pay the balance due on the contract, the court saying:
Specific performance should not be decreed on behalf of a purchaser of
real estate unless such purchaser is able and willing to perform his part
of the contract.15
The Dornyan case is thus an additional illustration of the tendency of Missouri
courts to find a waiver of a forfeiture provision as a measure of liquidated damages
whenever possible.
Waiver of such a provision has also been found in order to allow a purchaser
tnder an installment land contract to maintain an action for trespass against the
seller of the land subject to the contract. In Poole v. Roloffl6 plaintiffs were in
possession of a farm as purchasers under an installment land contract which con-
tained a forfeiture provision allowing sellers to retain all payments as liquidated
damages and to enter and retake the premises if purchasers failed to make delin-
quent payments within thirty days after notice that the payments were in default.
Sellers gave notice of default on July 1, 1958, but thereafter orally assured pur-
chasers that if the back payments were made and current payments continued,
sellers would not consider the contract void. Thereafter, sellers accepted payments
from the purchasers.
In April 1959 sellers went on the premises and removed timber. Purchasers
brought an action for trespass. Sellers contended that because of the July 1958
notice, purchasers did not have the possession of the land necessary to maintain
an action of trespass.
The court held, citing Bogad v. Wachter,1 7 that sellers had waived the for-
feiture provision by accepting late payments and by recognizing the contract's
existence in communications with purchasers several times after the purported
July 1958 cancellation; and that therefore purchasers had sufficient possession to
maintain an action for trespass.
Thus, Missouri courts today seem hesistant to give full effect to forfeiture pro-
visions as measures of liquidated damages in installment land contracts. They are
likely to find that such provisions have been waived by the vendor due to such
acts as his acceptance of late payments of principal or of interest on late payments
14. Supra note 2.
15. Id. at 72.
16. Supra note 3.
17. Supra note 11.
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after the delinquency of those payments. s Furthermore, waiver of forfeiture pro-
visions is equally likely to be found in any of the following in which a land in-
stallment contract is involved: viz., an action for ejectment by a vendor, an action
for specific performance by a defaulting vendee, a counterclaim for specific per-
formance by a defaulting vendee who is defendant to an action for ejectment, or
even a trespass action by a defaulting vendee against his vendor concerning the
land that is the subject of the contract. The finding that such a forfeiture pro-
vision has been waived would be very likely if the value of the land subject to the
forfeiture provision substantially exceeded the amount still unpaid under the con-
tract.' 9
JOHN E. PARRISH
REAL PROPERTY-CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS IN MISSOURI-
LIFE ESTATE OR FEE SIMPLE
Shaw v. Wertz'
Silas H. Mellot died testate in 1918 and at the time of his death owned cer-
tain real estate. Decedent died childless, and was survived by his wife, Clara M.
Mellot, four brothers and four sisters. The single dispositive sentence in his will
was as follows:
Therefore, be it known to all concerned, that I S. H. Mellot at my death
(and after my just debts are paid) do Will and Bequeath all the re-
mainder of my property of whatsoever nature, to my beloved wife Mrs.
Clara M Mellot-nee Roy, she to have complete control and free will in
the management and disposal of same so long as she may live.
2
After the death of Silas H. Mellot, Clara M. Mellot occupied the land until her
death in 1951. She left a will which purportedly devised the above described
premises to defendant Marie Dale. Plaintiff Shaw and other heirs at law of
decedent, Silas H. Mellot, brought this action to determine title to and partition
realty devised by Clara M. Mellot to defendant Marie Dale.
Plaintiffs contended that Clara M. Mellot received only a life estate and up-
on her death the land reverted to them as heirs at law of Silas H. Mellot. It was
18. Cf. GILL, MISSOURI TITLES § 1659 (4th ed. 1960).
19. In light of the recent decision in Berry v. Crouse, 376 S.W.2d 107 (Mo.
1964), the same result sought by the use of an installment land contract with a
forfeiture provision might be obtainable in some circwmstances by executing an in-
stallment land contract without a forfeiture provision and subsequently executing
a lease of the same land with an option to buy, the lease providing for rental pay-
ments of the same amount and due at the same time as the installment payments
under the sales contract.
1. 369 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. 1963).
2. Id. at 217.
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defendant's contention that Clara M. Mellot received a fee simple absolute and
that her subsequent devise to Marie Dale effectively conveyed an absolute estate.
Thus, the primary question before the court in this case was whether Clara M.
Mellot received a fee simple or merely a life estate.
In 1825 Missouri codified the common law rule as to devises that technical
words are not necessary to create a fee, and raised a presumption that the testator
intended to pass his entire estate.3 With respect to deeds, in 1835 Missouri
abolished the requirement of words of inheritance to create a fee simple and
created a presumption that the grantor intended to pass his entire estate.4 Thus,
standing alone, the first phrase of testator's devise,
I ...do Will and Bequeath all the remainder of my property of what-
soever nature, to my beloved wife Mrs. Clara Mellot-nee Roy, . ..5
would have passed an estate in fee simple to testator's widow. Therefore, the de-
cisive question before the court was the effect of the subsequent additional language,
.she to have complete control and free will in the management and
disposal of the same so long as she may live.0
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of a will is that the intention of the
testator shall control,7 and that intention shall be gathered from the whole in-
strument s by giving every clause in the will full effect.9 Accordingly, in the princi-
pal case the court found that testator's language, "I . . .do Will and Bequeath all
the remainder of my property of whatsoever nature . . . ," purported to dispose
of his entire estate to his wife, and a construction of a mere life estate, accom-
panied with an added power of disposal, would be contrary to his expressed in-
tention.10 This construction is in conformity with the presumption that a testator
intends to dispose of his whole estate and to die intestate as to none of it.:"
In a much stronger case for a life estate construction, the Kansas supreme
court in Walker v. Koepcke,' 2 nevertheless held the limitation, "I give, devise and
bequeath to my wife, . . .All the remainder . .. During her natural life," as
passing an estate in fee simple. In so holding, the court based its decision on the
intention of the testator and the presumption against partial intestacy.'3 Where
the language of the testator shows a contrary intent, however, the presumption
3. § 19, at 795, RSMo 1825.
4. § 2, at 119, RSMo 1835.
5. Shaw v. Wertz, supra note 1, at 217.
6. Ibid.
7. Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 280 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. 1955); Adams
v. Simpson, 358 Mo. 168, 213 S.W.2d 908 (1948); Crews v. Crews, 240 S.W. 149
(Mo. 1922); Smith v. Hutchinson, 61 Mo. 83 (1875).
8. Lewis v. Lewis, 345 Mo. 816, 136 S.W.2d 66 (1940).
9. Scullin v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 361 Mo. 337, 234
S.W.2d 597 (1951).
10. Shaw v. Wertz, supra note 1, at 217.
11. Tellerson v. Taylor, 282 Mo. 204, 220 S.W. 950 (1920).
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against partial intestacy is of no avail.14 Thus, in construing the whole instrument,
the subsequent language in the last phrase of the quoted limitation in Walker v.
Koepcke could very well have defeated the presumption against partial intestacy.
Testator's intention in the principal case, as indicated by the limitation, is
open to either of two possible constructions. Either he intended that an estate
in fee simple absolute should pass to his wife, to be enjoyed in fact by her dur-
ing her lifetime, 15 or he intended the estate should be limited to the period of
her lifetime with an additional power of disposal.16 These alternatives result from
the ambiguity of this limitation, and the courts have not been uniform in con-
struing limitations of this type. Some courts have upheld the creation of a fee sim-
ple in limitations such as, "in fee simple for life,"I? "to W, her heirs and assigns,
for her lifetime,"'i s or "as long as life doth last. 10 These decisions were based on
testator's intention as disclosed by considering the entire instrument and the sur-
rounding circumstances. Other courts, finding an intention contrary to a fee, have
construed similar language as passing only a life estate to the devisee.20
14. Crowson v. Crowson, 323 Mo. 633, 19 S.W.2d 634 (1929).
15. Pfeifer v. Wright, 34 F.2d 690 (N.D. Okl. 1929).
16. Smith v. Smith, 359 Mo. 44, 220 S.W.2d 10 (1949).
I am indebted to Professor Willard L. Eckhardt, of the University of Missouri
School of Law, for a suggestion as to another possible meaning not advanced in
either brief. The words, "she to have complete control and free will in the man-
agement and disposal of same so long as she may live," may have been designed
to give a female the sole and separate use of her fee simple, free from any inter-
ference or control by a husband she might marry. The usual form to accomplish
such purpose was a gift to the female "to her sole and separate use, free from the
interference or control of her said husband or of any future husband she may
have"; the basic gift might be "to W," or "to W and her heirs." See WHIrTLsEY,
MISSOURI FoRM BOOK §§ 485-86 (1857); PArrISON, MISSOURI FoRM BOOK §§ 171-72
(2d ed. by Herron, 1912). Such a provision has not been necessary as to Missouri
land since the Married Women's Act of 1889, § 451.250 RSMo 1959, but for some
years thereafter could be useful in a will as to land the testator might own in
other states. The 1912 edition of PATrisON carries no indication that the "sole and
separate use" clauses are no longer needed in Missouri, and these 1912 forms appear
to be ones for current use.
In the principal case the will was executed in 1912 and the testator died in
1918. There must have been some "sole and separate use" clauses in wills as late
as 1918. An examination of probate records might indicate that at one time the
language used in the will in the principal case was in somewhat general use, or
was a reasonable facsimile of such a clause. If the words in question comprise a
"sole and separate use" clause, then they are given a function to serve other than
cutting a fee down to a life estate.
Professor Eckhardt pointed out that the extensive use in Missouri of the fee
tail limitation in favor of a female may have been to provide in a crude way for a
separate estate for a married woman, and that its continued popularity after 1889
may have been the result of habit rather than of any real function to be served.
17. McAllister v. Tate, 11 Rich. L.(S.C.) 509, 73 Am. Dec. 119 (1818).
18. Lambe v. Drayton, 182 Ill. 110, 55 N.E. 189 (1899).
19. In re Brown, 119 Kan. 402, 239 Pac. 747 (1925).
20. E.g., Kiplinger v. Kiplinger, 185 Ind. 81, 113 N.E. 292 (1916) (To W,
she to have full control for and during her natural life; h-eld, Life Estate); Embry's
Ex'x v. Embry's Devisees, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 295, 102 S.W. 239 (1907) (To W, to
do with as she tmay please during her life; held, Life Estate); Johns v. Johns, 86
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The Supreme Court of Missouri in deciding the instant case relied heavily
on the Oklahoma decision in the case of Pfeifer v. Wright.21 In construing the
limitation, "And I give and bequeath to my wife, ... to be used by her so long
as she lives and enjoys the same,"22 the court there held that the clause, "to be
used by her so long as she lives and enjoys the same,"23 was insufficient to cut
down the fee simple in the devise. After discussing the rule that testator's inten-
tion must prevail in the construction of will, the Oklahoma court said,
The reasonable construction to be placed upon the words employed in
the will, "to be used by her so long as she lives and enjoys the same," is
that the deceased expressed a desire that the widow might enjoy the
estate; certainly she could not enjoy it if she were not living, so the inser-
tion of these words, "so long as she lives," was a way of expressing desire
concerning her enjoying the estate.24
In the Pfeifer case, plaintiff contended the wife was given a life estate rather than
a fee. This was rejected by the court because the language employed therein
did not clearly express the devise of a life estate.25 The court further reasoned
that since there was no designated remainder over after the decease of his wife,
testator intended a complete disposition of his property in this devise.26
Although the holding in the Oklahoma case is consistent with the decision
in the instant case, the cases can be distinguished. In the Pfeifer case the limita-
tion did not contain an express grant of the power of disposal, whereas in the
instant case the testator expressly provided for a power of disposal in the devisee.
Accordingly, appellants in the instant case contended that the express devise of
the power of disposal is a contradiction to the devise of a fee, because the owner
of a fee already has the full power to convey the same and there is no need to
mention specifically a power of disposition.27 It is well settled in Missouri that a
life estate will not be enlarged to a fee simple by expressly giving a power of
disposal.28 However, it does not necessarily follow that the express limitation of a
power of disposal would reduce a fee simple to a life estate.2 9 In fact a fair test
whether a fee is created is to ascertain from the document whether or not there
ii provided an unlimited power of disposal.8 0
21. Pfeifer v. Wright, supra note 15.
22. Id. at 691.
23. Ibid.
24. Id. at 693.
25. Pfeifer v. Wright, supra note 15.
26. Ibid.
27. Brief for Appellant, Shaw v. Wertz, p. 9.
28. Smith v. Smith, 359 Mo. 44, 220 S.W.2d 10 (1949); Masterson v. Master-
son, 344 Mo. 1188, 130 S.W.2d 629 (1939); Blumer v. Gillispie, 338 Mo. 1113, 93
S.W.2d 939 (1936); Hamner v. Edmonds, 327 Mo. 281, 36 S.W.2d 929 (1931);
Tisdale v. Prather, 210 Mo. 402, 109 S.W. 41 (1908); Evans v. Folks, 135 Mo. 397,
37 S.W. 126 (1896); Lewis v. Pittman, 101 Mo. 281, 14 S.W. 52 (1890); Rubey v.
Barnett, 12 Mo. 3 (1848).
29. Vaughan v. Compton, 361 Mo. 467, 235 S.W.2d 328 (1950); Presbyterian
Orphanage v. Fitterling, 342 Mo. 299, 114 S.W.2d 1004 (1938); Fries v. Fries, 306
Mo. 101, 267 S.W. 116 (1924).
30. Owensboro Banking Co. v. Lewis, 269 Ky. 277, 106 S.W.2d 1000 (1937).
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In recognizing the possibility of a life estate accompanied with a power of
disposal, prior Missouri decisions have confined this result to two types of limita-
tions. They have required either an express limitation of a life estate followed by a
power of disposal,31 or a general devise with a power of disposal followed by a
shifting executory interest.32 Moreover, in the case of a shifting executory interest
following a power of disposal, Missouri cases show a strong preference for con-
struing a limitation as creating a life estate and remainder in fee, subject to a
power in the life tenant, rather than as a defeasible fee with power and shifting
executory interest.3s Thus, the decision of this court was in accord with prior
decisions insofar as the limitation in question contained neither an express limita-
tion of a life estate followed by a power of disposal, nor an express remainder pro-
vision.
However, a further examination of Missouri authority reveals a prior decision
of the Missouri Supreme Court reaching a different result in the construction of a
limitation somewhat similar to, but distinguishable from, that in the instant case.
The Missouri case of Rubey v. Barnett34 dealt with the construction of a limitation
which read,
First, my will is that my beloved wife, Polly Horn, have all my estate,
both real and personal, so long as she may live: secondly, my will is,
that my wife dispose of all said estate as she may think most advisable
at her death.3 5
This court there held that the wife acquired only a life estate in the property with
a reversion in testator's heirs.-s This often cited case established the rule in Mis-
souri that,
When an express estate for life is given, and afterwards a power of dis-
position is conferred, then the devisee takes but a life estate with a power
of disposition, and if no disposition is made, the reversion will go to the
heirs of the devisor.37
The court there distinguished this case from the earlier New York case of Jackson
v. Robins3s where the court stated,
[AInd we may lay it down as an incontrovertible rule, that where an estate
is given to a person generally, or indefinitely, with a power of dis-
31. Cases cited note 28 supra.
32. Glidewell v. Glidewell, 360 Mo. 713, 230 S.W.2d 752 (1950); English v.
Ragsdale, 347 Mo. 431, 147 S.W.2d 653 (1940); Aurien v. Security Nat'l Bank Sav-
ings & Trust Co., 137 S.W.2d 679 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940); Graham v. Stroh, 342
Mo. 686, 117 S.W.2d 258 (1938); Presbyterian Orphanage v. Fitterling, 342 Mo.
299, 114 S.W.2d 1004 (1938); Blumer v. Gillespie, 338 Mo. 1113, 93 S.W.2d 939
(1936); Sorenson v. Booram, 317 Mo. 516, 297 S.W. 70 (1927); Schneider v.
Kloepple, 270 Mo. 389, 193 S.W. 834 (1917); Gibson v. Gibson, 239 Mo. 490, 144
S.W. 770 (1912); Armor v. Frey, 226 Mo. 646, 126 S.W. 483 (1910). See also 11
U. Mo. BULL. (Law Series) 37-51 (1916).
33. Ibid.
34. 12 Mo. 5 (1848).
35. Id. at 7.
36. Rubey v. Barnett, supra note 34.
37. Id. at 7.
38. Jackson v. Robins, 16 Johns. R. 537 (N. Y. 1819).
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position, it carries a fee; and the only exception to the rule is, where the
testator gives to the first taker an estate for life only, by certain and ex-
press words, and annexes to it a power of disposal.39
The Rubey case was the exception to the rule rather than the rule because the
life estate was expressly given in the first instance.
In the opinion in the instant case the Missouri Supreme Court did not discuss
the Rubey case which was cited by both counsel. Nevertheless, it can be dis-
tinguished from the instant case through a close examination of each limitation.
In the Rubey case the limitation read essentially (emphasis added), "To W, so
long as she may live . . . , that my wife dispose of all said estate as she may
think most advisable at her death,"40 whereas the limitation in the present case
read (emphasis added), "To W, . . . she to have complete control and free will
in the management and disposal of same so long as she may live."41 In the RUbey
case the language which might denote a life estate preceded the grant of the
added power of disposal. However, in the instant case the language which might
denote a life estate is posited subsequent to the general devise and power of dis-
posal. Thus, the determination of the quantity of the estate seemingly depends
on the position of the specific language within the limitation. Because the general
devise with the added power of disposal preceded the language which might de-
note a life estate, the instant case is within the earlier rule of Jackson v. Robins
rather than the exception to the rule as was the Rubey case.
In deciding the instant case the Missouri Supreme Court did not consider the
possible applicability of its prior decision in the case of tlwnter v. Hu~nter-u as it
was not cited by either counsel. The court there held the devise,
I give and devise unto my mother, . . . and unto my sister, . ..as joint
tenants with the right of survivorship, all of the real estate which I may
own at the time of my death,4 3
created a joint life estate with a remainder in the whole going to the survivor as
an estate in fee simple. The court held that § 474.480, RSMo 1957 Supp., the sec-
tion raising a presumption of a fee, was not applicable because there was a con-
trary intention arrived at by giving effect to "with the right of survivorship.""
The court rejected the argument that the words, "with the right of survivorship,"
were simply descriptive of the principal incident of a joint tenancy in fee. Apply-
ing this doctrine to the present case, the logical result, to give effect to every
leading word in the will, would have been a life estate with an added power of
disposal and a reversion in the heirs at the death of the first taker because the
words would serve no useful function if the widow got a fee.4 In fact, the de-
39. Id. at 587.
40. Rubey v. Barnett, supra note 55.
41. Shaw v. Wertz, supra note 1.
42. 320 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1959).
43. Id. at 530.
44. Hunter v. Hunter, supra note 42, at 532.
45. See note 16, supra.
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termination of a life estate in the instant case would have been more feasible than
in the Hunter case because of the express words, "so long as she may live." 46
However, since the Hunter case was not before the court, it did not consider its
possible application. But unless the application of the doctrine set forth in the
Himter case is limited to limitations dealing with concurrent interests, the instant
case could easily have been decided differently.
This was a close case, with no exact precedent, and could have been decided
either way. The case reemphasizes the point that if a life estate rather than a fee
is intended, the draftsman should use clear and explicit language. On the other
hand, if a fee is intended, it should not be left to the statutory presumption, but
should be expressly so limited.
JOHN K. PRUELLAGE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION--"ACCIDENT" RELATED TO STRAIN-
MISSOURI COURTS APPLY NARROW CONSTRUCTION
Hall v. Mid-Continent Mfg. Co.1
Claimant was a 47 year old woman employee of a manufacturing company
operating under the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Law.2 Part of her job
consisted of "notching" long pieces of aluminum by using a machine which rested
on the floor. Claimant suffered extensive abdominal adhesions and a hiatus hernia
when in an effort to break loose a piece of aluminum stuck in the machine, she
placed her foot on the machine and pulled and strained as hard as she could. The
machine had stuck on previous occasions during the year immediately preceding
the injury, and claimant had on prior occasions either broken the aluminum loose
in the described manner or solicited help from other employees.
Claimant sought Workmen's Compensation benefits by reason of an "acci-
dent,"s arising out of and in the course of her employment. The Kansas City
Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment of the circuit court approving findings of
the Industrial Commission, denying compensation. The court said:
The Commission found "it was routine for the employee on occasion
to place her foot on the machine for additional pulling power as she
struggled to remove the extrusion." . . . That on this occasion she was not
exerting any more force or pulling in any different manner than on other
occasions. And further, the strain cannot be said to have been abnormal
46. Shaw v. Wertz, supra note 1.
1. Hall v. Mid-Continent Mfg. Co., 366 S.W.2d 57 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
2. Ch. 287 RSMo 1959.
3. Ch. 287.020 (2), RSMo 1959 provides: "The word 'accident' as used
in this chapter shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context,
be construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly and
violently, with or without human fault and producing at the time objective symp-
toms of an injury."
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or unexpected--"Only the result, to-wit; the injury, can be said to have
been unexpected."'
Confusion and controversy has haunted the Missouri courts as to whether a
compensable "accident" within the meaning of the Missouri Workmen's Com-
pensation Law is the cause or the result of a strain, and whether the strain itself
may be a usual or expected one, or must be one which is unusual or unexpected.
The definition of the term "accident" is the same today as it was under the orig-
inal act;5 however, Missouri courts have been inconsistent in construing the term
"accident" in particular fact situations, some of which seem irreconcilable. Early
courts of appeals cases0 were based on a popular concept of "accident" which did
not distinguish between "event" or "accident" and the resulting injury. Undoubt-
edly claimant in the present case would have recovered under the law as ex-
pressed in the earlier cases even though her injury resulted from doing work in
the usual or routine manner.
Without expressly overruling these earlier decisions, the Missouri Supreme
Court, in State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes,7 rejected the view that
a strain or exertion while doing ordinary work in the usual manner could give rise
to an unexpected result. Claimant in the Hussman case suffered a coronary oc-
clusion while carrying a bucket of water in the performance of his usual duties.
Denying compensation the court held that the injury itself would not constitute
the "event" or "accident," because if it did, the employer in effect would be an
unlimited insurer going beyond the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation
Law.8 The result of the Hussman case has been a narrow rule applied to allow
compensation only where the facts and evidence show the strain itself was un-
usual or abnormal.0
4. Hall v. Mid-Continent Mfg. Co., supra note 1, at 63.
5. Supra note 3; See Mo. Laws 1925, at 375, § 7 (b).
6. Carr v. Murch Bros. Constr. Co., 223 Mo. App. 788, 792, 21 S.W.2d 897,
899 (St. L. Ct. App. 1929), holding: "The 'unexpected or unforeseen event; as
used in this statute, includes an unexpected or unforeseen event (result) ensuing
from a usual and intentional act or movement of the claimant done in the or-
dinary course of his employment. This is the meaning of the term 'accident' as
it is ordinarily understood, and there is nothing in the statute to indicate that the
term is there used in the restricted and technical sense... "
Accord, Guillod v. Kansas City Power and Light Co., 224 Mo. App. 382, 18
S.W.2d 97 (K.C. Ct. App. 1929); Drecksmith v. Universal Carloading & Distribut-
ing Co., 18 S.W.2d 86 (St. L. Mo. App. 1929). All three cases allowed compensa-
tion for "accident" caused by usual strain while the employee was doing his routine
work in the usual manner.
7. State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 319, 153 S.W.2d
40 (1941), based in part on Delille v. Holton-Seelye Co., 334 Mo. 464, 66 S.W.2d
834 (1933), and Joyce v. Luse-Stevenson Co., 346 Mo. 58, 139 S.W.2d 918 (1940),
rev'd, State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 319, 153 S.W.2d 40
(1941).
8. State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 319, 326, 153
S.W.2d 40, 42 (1941).
9. Crow v. Missouri Implement Tractor Co., 307 S.W.2d 401 (Mo. En Banc
1957); State ex. rel. United Transps., Inc., v. Blair, 180 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. En Banc
1944); Brotherton v. International Shoe Co., 360 S.W.2d 108 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962);
Williams v. Anderson Air Activities, 319 S.W.2d 61 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958).
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Missouri courts have not definitely decided whether the unusual or abnormal
strain for which compensation may be awarded can arise while the employee is
engaged in his usual activities or whether it must occur while the employee is
doing his work in an abnormal manner. The cases seem to hold the latter, but
there is at least some dictum in favor of recovery even though the employee is
engaged in his usual activities.10 Regardless which view is correct, a rule such as
followed in Missouri, which allows compensation only for unusual or abnormal
strains, as in the present case, represents a definite minority view, as the over-
whelming majority of states consider injuries caused by strain as compensable
accidents within the meaning of workmen's compensation laws even though the
work being done at the time of the injury was routine and the strain causing
the injury was not unusual or abnormal.- Much criticism has been directed by
eminent authorities in the field of workmen's compensation towards those states,
such as Missouri, which still cling to this narrow construction of "accident.'
12
The Michigan Supreme Court in Shepard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 8 partially
in response to Dean Roscoe Pound's "bad eminence" criticism,' recognized that
it had been grudgingly construing "accident" so as to defeat the purpose of its
Workmen's Compensation Act, and allowed an award for an "injury" caused by
a usual strain while the employee was doing her ordinary work. Before the Shep-
ard case, Michigan courts, like the present Missouri courts, had construed "event"
10. Crow v. Missouri Implement Tractor Co., 307 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Mo. En
Banc 1957); Brotherton v. International Shoe Co., 360 S.W.2d 108, 114 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1962); Williams v. Anderson Air Activities, 319 S.W.2d 61, 65 (Spr. Mo. App.
1958).
11. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 38.20 (1952), lists at least
forty states which have allowed compensation for injuries resulting from usual
exertion even though the employee was engaged in his usual duties. Compensation
has been allowed for hernia, cerebral hemorrhage, arterial or blood-vessel rupture,
ruptured aneurism, apoplexy, ruptured appendix, herniated intervertebral disc,
stomach rupture, dislocated kidney, dislocated cervical cord, and detached retina;
5 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 1446 (3d ed. 1946). See Annot., 98
A.L.R. 205 (1935), for a collection of cases pertaining specifically to hernia.
12. Pound, Comment on Recent Important Workmen Compensation Cases,
15 NACCA L.J. 45, 54 (1955), in which Dean Roscoe Pound severely criticized
the Michigan Supreme Court for its decision in Nichols v. Central Crate & Box
Co., 340 Mich. 232, 65 N.W.2d 706 (1954), in which an employee was denied com-
pensation for a paralytic stroke caused by attempting to raise a log in the or-
dinary course of his work. Dean Pound remarked: "Michigan has attained a bad
eminence in narrow interpretation and application of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. Larson reminds us El LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, §§ 38.00,
38.10, 38.20 (1952)) that before any American state adopted the phrase 'injury
by accident' from the British Act, the English courts had settled that although
the cause was routine and accidental, it was enough if the effect on the employee
was unexpected and catastrophic and so accidental. As it is well settled when a
statute which has been authoritatively construed is adopted by legislators else-
where the construction is deemed adopted with the text, this should be enough,
and such is the holding in the majority of jurisdictions." See 19 NACCA LJ. 34(1957); 20 NACCA L.J. 32 (1957).
13. Shepard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 83 N.W.2d 614 (1957).
In accord, Coombe v. Penegor, 348 Mich. 635, 83 N.W.2d 603 (1957).
14. 15 NACCA L.J. 45, 54 (1955).
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or "accident" to embody only the cause aspect, excluding the unexpected result of
ordinary work.'8 Shepard reconstrued "accident" to include both the unexpected
cause and the unexpected result16
Accidental injuries have been defined in many ways;17 one recognized workable
definition is that offered by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Bryant Stave & Head-
ing Co. v. White:
An accidental injury arises out of the employment when the required
exertion producing the injury is too great for the person undertaking the
work, whatever the degree of exertion or the condition of his health, pro-
vided the exertion is either the sole or a contributing cause of the injury.
In short, that an injury is accidental when either the cause or the result
is unexpected or accidental, although the work being done is usual or or-
dinary.18
This writer's opinion is that the Missouri Supreme Court should reconsider
its narrow construction of the term "accident," and in the next case in which the
question is properly presented, readopt the view of the earlier courts of appeals
cases' 0 and align Missouri with the overwhelming majority of states allowing
compensation for an injury caused by a strain such as in the present case. This
narrow intrepretation of "accident" defeats the purpose of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law as stated by the Missouri Supreme Court itself:
The fundamental purpose of the Legislature in inacting the Workmen's
Compensation Law was, as a matter of public welfare, to place upon
industry the losses sustained by workmen and their dependents by reason
of injuries and death arising out of and in the course of employment-the
theory being that compensation for such losses should be paid by industry
rather than to leave the injured employee or his dependents to bear such
loss alone.20
The decision in the present case is not only inconsistent with the purpose of
the Law; it is absurd to say that a strain exerted which pulls, breaks, and tears
the tissues of the human body "cannot be said to have been abnormal or un-
expected." 2'
The Missouri courts today enjoy the "bad eminence" which distressed the
Michigan Supreme Court prior to the Shepard case. Much truth and wisdom is
15. Wieda v. American Box Board Co., 343 Mich. 182, 72 N.W.2d 13 (1955).
Note particularly the dissenting opinion which is the basis for the majority opinion
in Shepard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, supra note 13.
16. Shepard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, supra note 13, at 603, 83 N.W.2d at625.
17. Bryant Stave & Heading Co. v. White, 227 Ark. 147, 296 S.W.2d 436
(1956).
18. Id. at 155, 296 S.W.2d at 441.
19. Supra note 6.
20. Hickey v. Board of Education, 363 Mo. 1039, 1043, 256 S.W.2d 775, 777(1953), citing Beatty v. Chandeysson Elec. Co., 238 Mo. App. 868, 879, 190 S.W.2d
648, 654 (1945); § 287.800, RSMo 1959.
21. Hall v. Mid-Continent Mfg. Co., 366 S.W.2d 57 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
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found in the forceful majority opinion in that case by Justice Talbot Smith,
native of Fayette, Missouri and former Professor of Law at the University of Mis-
souri:
Thus in one state after another a rule of reason consonant with the pur-
pose of the act replaces arbitrary judicial fiat. Neither Arkansas,22 . . .
nor Florida28 acted under the whip of legislative compulsion. Each was
secure in the knowledge that a court has inherent power to purge itself
of its own errors. Failing in this duty, the day inevitably approaches when
a court will stand alone, while the stream of life flows by, avoiding, but
not being impeded by, the curious derelict in its path.24
WILLiAm F. StrrrR
22. Bryant Stave &'Heading Co. v. White, supra note 17.
23. Gray v. Employers Mutual Liab. Ins. Co., 64 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1953).
24. Shepard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, supra note 13 at 583, 83 N.W.2d at 615.
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